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Abstract
Concentration of immigrants and its associated externalities have
become an important topic in contemporary international migration
research, both from a methodological as well as an empirical perspec-
tive. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims to provide
an overview of that part of the migration literature that is concerned
with the externalities created by the influx of immigrants. Second, it
presents a stylized model in which human capital accumulation and
ethnic cluster formation are explicitly incorporated. The model shows
that lock-in effects can result from heterogeneous human capital and
spillover effects on different spatial levels. Extensions of the model
are discussed, together with their possible impacts on the spatial vari-
ation of the evolution of human capital stocks.
Keywords: Ethnic concentration, human capital, migration, migration
costs.
JEL-code: J61, R11
1 INTRODUCTION
1 Introduction
During the last decade, an increasing body of the empirical migration liter-
ature has dealt with the phenomenon of ethnic concentration, its causes and
its economic consequences (Bartel 1989, LaLonde and Topel 1991, De Graaff
2002). Traditional neoclassical migration models have been argued not to
be very appropriate in explaining this stylized fact. They predict that work-
ers migrate to those locations where their labor skills are scarce (see inter
alia Greenwood and McDowell 1986, Massey et al. 1993, Borjas 1994, for
comprehensive overviews of the literature). Thus, one would expect that
immigrants spread out over space and sectors. Empirical evidence clearly
shows the opposite: immigrants are concentrated in specific cities, neigh-
borhoods and sectors (see De Graaff 2002, for a recent overview). Recently,
economic models have been developed that are able to deal with the spa-
tial concentration of foreign immigrants. A common characteristic of these
theoretical models is the presence of externalities, which are created by
migrant groups and that directly or indirectly affect the migration costs
and human capital accumulation. The literature contains at least five ap-
proaches to model ethnic concentration. The most influential is that of Bor-
jas (1992, 1995) who introduced the concept of ethnic capital, being a local,
ethnic-specific spillover in human capital accumulation. In his view, im-
migrants cluster because of opportunities created by specific ethnic niches.
According to Borjas, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of ethnic
capital, or – in his own words –
“Ethnicity has an impact above and beyond both parental and
neighborhood effects for persons who are frequently exposed to
a particular ethnic environment.” (Borjas 1995, p. 389)
The advantage of his theory is that it can explain different degrees of clus-
tering among ethnic groups. The second line of research is that of Stark
(1991, 1994) in which low-skilled migrants are inclined to mix with high-
skilled migrants in order to obscure their skill signals. Low-skilled mi-
grants then take advantage of the imperfect information that (indigenous)
employers have. Eventually, this will lead to lower wage offers to all im-
migrants caused by asymmetric information and thus depresses incentives
to invest in human capital. Hendricks (2001) provides a third reason for
migrants to cluster. He argues that due to skill complementarity and im-
perfectly observable worker’s skills, immigrants cluster. New immigrants
choose to live near existing immigrants to take advantage of cross-matching.
Employers then use ethnicity as a proxy for skills. This has two strong im-
plications: (i) incentives for clustering vary between different ethnic groups
and (ii) second-generation immigrants have less incentives to cluster than
first-generation immigrants because usually the former group is higher
skilled than the latter. Epstein and Hillman (1998) use another argument
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based on herd behavior to explain ethnic concentration. When a large
group of previous migrants has gone to location A, new migrants will also
be attracted to A, even though they have information that B would be the
better choice. In this line of thinking, migrants take the decision of others
into account, because other migrants may have access to information that
they do not have. The fifth approach is that of Carrington et al. (1996), who
introduce endogenous migration costs to explain ethnic clustering. The
larger the stock of migrants in A, the lower are the migration costs for new
migrants to go to A. Except for the approach of Borjas – who argues that
ethnicity directly influences human capital accumulation – the other ap-
proaches acknowledge that some kind of network or information external-
ities are the cause for ethnic clustering, which in turn affects human capital
accumulation.
Before focusing on the development of human capital of ethnic groups,
it is insightful to look at the empirical evidence considering the relation be-
tween ethnic concentration and human capital formation. First, estimating
the effect of ethnic concentration on economic outcomes is not straightfor-
ward. Ethnic composition is arguably an endogenous variable; migrants
are selective in choosing for specific neighborhoods. Residential location of
a migrant is therefore probably correlated with labor market outcomes due
to unobserved attributes of the migrant.1 There are some ways out to cir-
cumvent this endogeneity effect in the estimation procedure. Borjas (1992,
1995) uses parental choices of residential location for the exogeneity of the
economic outcomes of their offspring. Cutler and Glaeser (1997), Bertrand
et al. (2000) and Dustmann and Preston (2001) avoid the endogeneity prob-
lem by using fixed spatial effects (on a city level). These studies typically
show that segregation in low-skilled areas is disadvantageous for ethnic
minorities.2 More recently, Edin et al. (2003) use a natural experiment to
properly identify the concentration effect. They look at the economic per-
formance of refugee immigrants who have been sorted by government au-
thorities. Their results modify the previously described results. Living in
an ethnically concentrated area improves the economic performance of im-
migrants ceteris paribus. However, the overall performance of the ethnic
group is crucial. Immigrants who are clustered in a high-income area seem
to benefit more than immigrants who are clustered in a low-income area.
To conclude, immigration tends to be associated with ethnic concen-
tration and affects average levels of human capital within those clustered
areas. This may have important consequences for human capital accumu-
lation of not only the immigrants, but also for the indigenous population
living close to the immigrant population. Since the seminal work of Lucas
1See Manski (1993) for fundamental critique on estimating social effects without proper
identification.
2Ethnic minorities are commonly defined as first and second generation immigrants.
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(1988), the notion that dispersion and creation of knowledge take largely
place within the boundaries of the city or the neighborhood has become
widespread and has been further developed by authors like Durlauf (1994),
Borjas (1995) and Be´nabou (1996a,b). The importance of human capital
can be deduced from the fact that it is the main determinant of present in-
come (Becker 1975), and that it acts as the engine for future income growth
(Romer 1986, Lucas 1988). So the externalities associated with immigration
and its corresponding impacts on human capital accumulation are most
likely the cause for lock-in effects of certain ethnics groups,3 their inferior
economic performance inmost cases,4 and their successful behavior in only
few cases.5 Therefore, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we
aim to give an overview of that part of the recent migration literature that
deals with ethnic clustering and its consequences. Second, we present a
basic model merging two main theories, namely, that of endogenous mi-
gration and that of human capital formation, which offers insight into the
cause and dynamics of heterogeneity in human capital on the level of cities
and neighborhoods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the basic model, which consists of a simple economy and a decision frame-
work for potential migrants along the lines of Sjaastad (1962). This model
mainly focuses on endogenous migration between two countries and de-
fines individual human capital accumulation. Subsequently, Section 3 pre-
sents the analytical results in a framework with homogeneous human cap-
ital both in the source country and in the country of destination. In Section
4, we relax the assumption of homogeneity. First, we focus on the dynam-
ics of human capital accumulation when migration is skill independent.
Thereafter, we assume that migration costs depend both on skills and mi-
grant networks and look at migration dynamics and human capital accu-
mulation in a simulation framework. The last section concludes.
2 AModel of Migration and Human Capital Accumu-
lation
In this section, we propose a model in which we have two countries (source
and destination) andwhere human capital and an exogenously given phys-
ical capital stock are the only production factors. Total production depends
3The Afro-American population group in the United States is a good example of an eth-
nic group that is characterized by lock-in effects, especially within certain neighborhoods
in the larger cities.
4Most ethnic groups originating from the so-called guestworkers in the 1970s and 1980s
in Western Europe perform economically consistently worse compared to the indigenous
population. Later generations do not seem to be able to catch up quickly.
5Nowadays, successful migrant groups are usually formed by high-skilled immigrants
(expats), with short migration spells.
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on total human capital, where human capital exhibits decreasing returns to
scale. Individual wages are proportional to the individual’s human capi-
tal. With equal human capital, there is an initial wage difference between
the source and the destination country, due to country-specific technology.6
Migration between the two economies is possible, but at a cost, which de-
pends on the stock of migrants already in the destination country and on
the amount of human capital that potential migrants possess. Here, we
adopt the theory of Carrington et al. (1996) of endogenous migration costs.
It states that costs of migration decrease in the size of the migrant network
in the country of destination, where costs are not onlymonetary, but also in-
volve psychological and information (search) costs. For example, the larger
a migrant network, the easier it will be for a new migrant to find a job
through the job referral system as suggested by Montgomery (1991). Mun-
shi (2003) offers an empirical study of such a job referral system used by
Mexican migrants in the United States and shows that an ethnic network
for new migrants is indeed beneficial, at least in the short run.
Human capital develops endogenously over time. We assume that hu-
man capital accumulation depends on three factors (Be´nabou (cf. 1996b)).
First, an individual’s personal amount of human capital influences the pro-
cess of accumulation. This reflects the influence of initial human capital
endowment and transmission within the family. Second, the aggregate hu-
man capital in the individual’s direct environment, i.e. the neighborhood,
affects human capital formation. Apart from directly learning from neigh-
bors, a person’s direct environment plays a pivotal role in providing infor-
mation, opportunities and role models. The third factor that plays a role in
human capital accumulation is the aggregate amount of human capital in
a country. This can be seen as reflecting the influence of average national
human capital on the development of the individual’s human capital, i.e.
by the national education system. The influence of aggregate human cap-
ital within a spatial area is defined by constant elasticity to scale aggrega-
tor functions, where aggregate human capital is determined by a human
capital spillover parameter. If the spillover parameter is positive, then va-
riety in human capital will lead to lower aggregate human capital. If it is
negative, then it will lead to higher aggregate human capital. In the for-
mer case, human capital spillovers are hampered by lack of ‘transactions’
(Lazear 1999). Basically, this means that there is insufficient communica-
tion due to a lack of trust, understanding or common language. The last
two arguments build on the notion that when variety in human capital
is too large, knowledge transfers are no longer possible. With a negative
6In this framework, country-specific technology can also be interpreted as restrictions
or barriers for production, such as climate, infertile land, and geographical features (such
as rivers, coastal waters and mountains). For historical examples of the effects of such
restrictions on economic performance, see De Vries and Van der Wouden (1995) and Mokyr
(1999). For empirical estimates of country-specific technologies, see Islam (1995).
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spillover parameter, there are returns to variety. In this case, individuals
have a common basis (e.g., the same language) on which they are willing
and able to communicate.
In addition to the development of human capital, the model can explain
differences in population size between countries and regions. Due to immi-
gration, richer countries have, ceteris paribus , a higher population growth.
However, the distribution of the immigrant population in the country of
destination is not even. Immigrants are attracted to those areas where for-
mer immigrants are situated, i.e. the city. Then, without intranational mi-
gration, these clustered areas will grow faster as compared to the rest of the
country or the city, thus leading to an even more uneven distribution of the
immigrant population. So, in this view, network externalities will lead to
agglomeration externalities.
The next subsection describes the economic setting inmore detail. There-
after, we deal with the individual’s decision to migrate.
2.1 The economy
We start with the construction of a simple economy. Suppose that total
output Yj,t in a country j at time t is defined by the following production
function:
Yj,t = AjK
1−ρ
j (
∑
i∈Lt
hi,j,t)ρ, ρ < 1, (1)
where Aj is country-specific technology, Kj is the exogenously given cap-
ital stock in j, Lt is the labor force of country j at time t, and hi,j are
individual-specific levels of human capital in country j. So, the total ef-
fective labor force in country j at time t equals Σi∈Lthi,j,t. Human capital is
the only production factor for output. We assume that the accumulation of
human capital is determined by the following relation (cf. Be´nabou 1996b)7:
hi,t+1 = Θhαi,tH
β
k,tH
γ
t , α, β, γ < 1, (2)
where Θ is a constant, Hk,t is composite human capital in neighborhood
k at time t, and Ht is national human capital at time t. Furthermore, we
assume that α + β + γ = 1.8 In contrast with Be´nabou, we regard (2)
not only as the education that a child receives, but also as the knowledge
that individuals gather during their working life. Thus, individual human
capital accumulation depends on three factors: namely, the individual’s
inherited human capital, the human capital in the local neighborhood or
direct environment of the individual, and the human capital accumulated
in the entire society (all displaying diminishing returns to scale).
7Country indices j are omitted where it leads to no confusion.
8This ensures endogenous human capital growth, because of non-diminishing returns
in the human capital accumulation function (cf. Rebelo 1991).
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We assume local (Hk,t) and national (Ht) human capital to be defined
by the following CES aggregators:
Hk,t =
 1
Lk,t
∑
i∈Lk,t
h
(ε−1)/ε
i,t
ε/(ε−1) (3)
and
Ht =
(
1
Lt
∑
i∈Lt
h
(σ−1)/σ
i,t
)σ/(σ−1)
, (4)
with Lk,t the labor force in neighborhood k at time t. In this case, if ε > 0
(σ > 0), then equation (3) ((4)) is convex in its argument. Heterogeneity is
then a source of loss
(
Hk,t < h
(
Ht < h
))
, where h denotes the average hu-
man capital, and individuals i are considered to be substitutes. The larger
1/ε (1/σ) is, the more Hk,t (Ht) will converge to the minimum of hi,t. On
the other hand, if 1/ε < 0 (1/σ < 0), then Hk,t (Ht) is concave, heterogene-
ity is a source of gains, and individuals i are considered to be complements
to each other. Therefore, the smaller 1/ε(1/σ), the more Hk,t (Ht) will con-
verge to the maximum of hi,t.9
Let us assume that initial human capital is lognormally distributed a-
cross individuals, with lnhi,0 ∼ N
(
µ, λ2
)
. Now, we can directly link ε and
σ with the human capital spillover functions, becauseHk,t = E[hi,t]e−λ
2/2ε,
and analogously Ht = E[hi,t]e−λ
2/2σ (see Be´nabou 1996b).10 This enables
us to interpret ε and σ as parameters, that reflect a loss (gain) when ε and σ
are positive (negative).
In order to gain insight into the behavior of the aggregator functions
Hk,t and Ht, Table 1 shows some values of Hk,t (Ht) that are obtained for
different values of ε (σ) and different variances of hi,t. Moreover, we vary
the distribution of hi,t, by using both a lognormal and a Bernoulli distribu-
tion.11
9Note that we consider individuals to be complements to each other when a heteroge-
neous labor force increases human capital accumulation, and they are substitutes for each
other when a homogeneous labor force adds to human capital accumulation.
10Because higher moments of the lognormal distribution are defined as E[hri,t] =
erµ+rλ
2/2 (see, e.g., Mood et al. 1974), we canwrite, for example, for the aggregator function
Ht = (
1
Lt
∑Lt
i=1 h
(σ−1)/σ
i,t )
σ/(σ−1) = E[hi,t]e−λ
2/2σ.
11Note that, for a Bernoulli distribution we get: Ht = ((1−p)h(σ−1)/σ1,t +ph(σ−1)/σ2,t )σ/σ−1).
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Table 1: Simulation values of Hk,t (Ht)with human
capital (hi,t) distributed over 1000 individuals
Lognormal (E[hi,t] = 1) Bernoulli (E[hi,t] = 1)
V ar[hi,t] V ar[hi,t]
1/ε, 1/σ 0 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 0.5
-10 1.000 2.559 4.021 1.000 1.408 1.603
-2 1.000 1.286 1.589 1.000 1.205 1.358
-0.5 1.000 1.072 1.133 1.000 1.063 1.126
0.5 1.000 0.958 0.919 1.000 0.993 0.853
2 1.000 0.815 0.685 1.000 0.750 0.499
10 1.000 0.394 0.220 1.000 0.540 0.316
Table 1 reveals that in the presence of heterogeneity for positive ε (σ),
Hk,t (Ht) will be lower than E[hi,t]. So substitutability leads to losses from
heterogeneity. In contrast, complementarity (negative ε (σ)) leads to gains
from heterogeneity. This applies for both distribution functions, although
the effects of increased heterogeneity are stronger in the case of the lognor-
mal distribution than in the case of the Bernouilli distribution.12
Whether heterogeneity causes an increase or a decrease of the effective
stock of human capital in a spatial area is an empirical question. Potentially,
a larger diversification in human capital is beneficial, because of the differ-
ent sets of knowledge available, indicating increasing returns to diversity.
However, too large differences in human capital may prevent individu-
als from communicating effectively and therefore impede the transfer of
knowledge, which leads to decreasing returns to diversity.13 Having speci-
fied the composites of human capital, we now have to relate human capital
to individual wages, in order to fully specify the dynamics of the model.
We assume that consumers have a linear utility function, so for each
individual:
max U0 =
∞∑
t=0
Ctδ
t, s.t. CtPC,t ≤ It, (5)
where δ is the discount factor and PC,t the price of consumption goods.
Since utility is linear, consumers have no incentive to smooth consumption.
So they immediately spend all their income (It) acquired byworking. Thus:∑
i
PC,tCi,t = PY,tYt. (6)
12In general, one can prove that, if hi,t is a positive random variable, then Ht (Hk,t) will
decrease in 1/σ (1/ε) (for more details, see Be´nabou 1996b).
13Lazear (1999) and De Graaff (2002) empirically deal with this trade-off between differ-
ent sets of knowledge and the ability to communicate. Moreover, Chiswick (1991, 1998)
finds a positive relation between earnings and indigenous language proficiency among im-
migrants.
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For convenience, we normalize the output price PY,t at 1. Total profits
in the economy at time t are then equal to:
Πt = Yt −
∑
i∈Lt
wi,t, (7)
with wi the individual wage. Profits accrue to the owners of capital,
who have the same utility function as consumers (equation (5)).Wages re-
flect the marginal product of labor (see e.g. Gravelle and Rees 1992), so:
wi,t = ρAK
1−ρ
(∑
i∈Lt
hi,t
)ρ−1
hi,t. (8)
The relative wage between two (arbitrary) individuals, k and l, thus
equals:
wk,t
wl,t
=
hk,t
hl,t
, (9)
from which we can derive – using equations (1) and (8) – that∑
i∈Lt
wi,t = ρYt. (10)
Basically, this defines the economy in a particular country. The next sub-
section presents the mechanisms driving migration between countries.
2.2 Endogenous migration
We suppose that there are two countries (each described by the basic econ-
omy, as laid out in the previous subsection) named the source (s) and the
destination (d). Furthermore, the country-specific technology is strictly lar-
ger in the country of destination, due to historical or geographical factors,
so Ad > As. Individuals migrate if their present discounted utility is larger
in the country of destination than in the country of origin. The present dis-
counted utility does not only depend on wages and the discount factor δ,
but also on migration costs. The migration costs are assumed to depend on
the stock of migrants and human capital according to:
ci,t = c (PM,t, hi,t) , (11)
with PM,t the stock of migrants in the receiving country. We assume
that the migration costs decrease in the stock of migrants and individual
human capital. Furthermore, ci,t > 0 always holds for each potential mi-
grant i. We assume that wages in d are initially higher than in s, due to
9
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better country-specific technologies A.14 Then, migrants will always flow
from s to d. Following the present value approach of Sjaastad (1962), we
can now determine the maximum present discounted utility values for an
individual i at time t in s, who migrates (M ) and in the case in which he
stays (S):
V Si,t =
wsi,t
1− δ , (12)
VMi,t =
wdi,t
1− δ − ci,t. (13)
In this specification, individuals do not take future development of hu-
man capital, and thus wages, into account. So, we assume that individuals
display myopic behavior instead of rational behavior.15
It is now useful to adopt from Carrington et al. (1996) the concept of the
marginal migrant who has human capital h˜ viz. that migrant who is indif-
ferent between migrating and staying. Because of the monotonic decrease
of costs in the stock of migrants, we can also put h˜ = φ (PM,t). Using (12) ,
the marginal migrant is indifferent between migrating or staying when the
following equality holds (Carrington et al. (cf. 1996)):
wdi,t − wsi,t
1− δ = c (PM,t, φ (PM,t)) . (14)
Equation (14) basically presents a cost-benefit approach, where the costs
exhibit a network externality.
Having specified the economies of the two countries and the mecha-
nism driving international migration, we can now turn to the analysis of
the relation between immigration and human capital dynamics. The next
section analyzes migration and human capital accumulation in the case of
within-country homogeneous human capital, so that the migration costs of
(11) only depend on the stock of migrants in d.
14If population sizes are highly unequal, then wages in a small country with an inferior
technology can be higher than in a large country with a superior technology, because there
are diminishing returns to human capital. So, due to differences in factor prices, people
could migrate from d to s, even though country-specific technology might be higher in d.
We avoid this situation by construction (i.e., the source country is assumed to be sufficiently
large).
15Thus, migrants take into account the influence of the stock of migrants (M ) on the
payoff of migrating, but not the (marginal) impact of their and future migrants’ migration
on future wages.
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3 Within-Country Homogeneous Human Capital
In this section, we look at the equilibrium when both country s and coun-
try d have a homogeneous labor force. With homogeneous human capital
in the source country, every individual would migrate if migration costs
are below a certain threshold. Therefore, we have to calculate an instan-
taneous macro-migration flow, Mt, at time t. Because we only analyze the
effects of one migration flow in this section, we omit the time-indices for
the comparative static analysis for clarity reasons.
Table 2 provides the comparative statics for the size of the instantaneous
migrant flow M . For more details and the specification of the macroeco-
nomic equilibrium we refer to Appendix A.
Table 2: Comparative statics forM
hs hd As Ad δ ρ PI Ps PM
+ − − + + + − + −/+
The comparative static results can be understood as follows (see Ap-
pendix A for technicalities). An increase in the human capital in the source
country (hs) has a positive impact, because migration costs will decrease
and wages in the destination (d) will increase for the immigrant popula-
tion relative to the source (s). Human capital in the country of destination
(hd) has a negative impact, because there are decreasing returns to total hu-
man capital. Therefore, if country d has a higher amount of average human
capital than country s, then a smaller wage will accrue to the immigrant
population due to the additive character of human capital in the produc-
tion function that is characterized by decreasing returns to scale. If wages
in s rise (due to a higher country specific technology (As)), then migration
will decrease, because of a higher utility in s. The discount factor (δ) has
a positive impact, because a higher δ means that future gains are more ap-
preciated relative to the one-time migration costs that has to be incurred in
the first period, so that more individuals will opt for the higher wages in d.
An increase in ρ increases the returns to total human capital, and therefore
increases individual wages. Because initially there is assumed to be a wage
gap between s and d, wages in d rise relatively stronger, which will have
a positive impact on the migration flow (M ). If the indigenous population
(PI ) in d increases, then the equilibrium value of M decreases, due to de-
creasing returns to total human capital, and thus lower wages in d. Finally,
a larger size of the population in swill increaseM , because of lower wages
in s due to higher population pressure. The effect of PM depends on two
factors, namely, the endogenous migration costs and the effect of the size
of the migrant population on the wages they earn in d. If PM is sufficiently
small, then the size of the migrant community contributes positively to the
migrant inflow (which can be regarded as a positive network externality
11
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Figure 1: Geographical configuration.
for the immigrants). If, however, it is smaller, then the stock of migrants
has a negative influence on M (which is caused by the decreasing returns
to scale in the production function).
We now turn to the dynamics of human capital accumulation. We still
assume one (initial) migrant flow, in contrast to the next section where we
also take the dynamics of migration into account. According to our model,
migrants will only go to one neighborhood (say k) in d.16 Figure 1 shows
the geographical configuration.
On the neighborhood level there is now a mixture between a (growing)
group of immigrants with an amount of human capital that deviates from
that of the indigenous population and a group of indigenous individuals
that gets smaller. For simplicity, we assume that there is no interregional
migration from k to d. Although human capital within groups is homo-
geneous and we only have one migration flow, it is interesting to look at
the dynamics of human capital accumulation in s, d and k. First, using (2),
it is easy to see that human capital in the source country accumulates as
follows:
lnhs,t+1 = θ + lnhs,t, (15)
where the growth constant θ is defined as ln Θ. Immigrants in d living
in k have the following human capital accumulation:
lnhs,k,t+1 = θ + α lnhs,k,t + (16)
16Regardless of where they live, immigrants earn the same wage in d. However, real-
istically, if immigrants take into account future human capital accumulation, then there is
the possibility that they will pay higher migration costs to go to a less ethnically-clustered
area, in order to gain a higher future wage for themselves or their children. Because we use
myopic behavior of individuals, our model does not incorporate this possibility.
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βε
ε− 1 ln
(
mk,th
(ε−1)/ε
s,k,t + (1−mk,t)h(ε−1)/εd,k,t
)
+
γσ
σ − 1 ln
(
mth
(σ−1)/σ
s,k,t + pk,th
(σ−1)/σ
d,k,t + (1−mt − pk,t)h(σ−1)/σd,t
)
.
Here,mk,t denotes the percentage of migrants in k at time t,mt denotes
the percentage of migrants in the whole country d at time t, pk,t the percent-
age of the indigenous population in k at time t relative to the whole country
d, hs,k,t is the amount of human capital of migrants in k at time t, and hd,k,t
is the human capital of the indigenous population in k at time t.17 This
specification follows from the fact that we consider the mixture between
immigrants and the indigenous population, for example, in neighborhood
k as an Bernoulli distribution. Human capital accumulation of the indige-
nous population in neighborhood k can be calculated analogously to the
migrant population. Now, it is not difficult to see that the difference in hu-
man capital between migrants and the indigenous population in k is equal
to (see also footnote 11):
lnhs,k,t+1 − lnhd,k,t+1 = α(lnhd,k,t − lnhs,k,t). (17)
So with homogeneous human capital in s and d, differences in the lev-
els of human capital within a neighborhood are only caused by initial dif-
ferences.18 Moreover, in the long run, the difference in the levels of hu-
man capital will decrease. Eventually, all individuals in k will have equal
amounts of human capital. So the values of human capital will converge.
Finally, after calculating human capital accumulation in the rest of the
destination country and comparing it to neighborhood k, we can state that
lnhd,t > lnhd,k,t, only if:
ε
ε− 1 ln
(
mk,th
ε−1/ε
s,k,t + (1−mk,t)h(ε−1)/εd,k,t
)
< lnhd,t, (18)
which occurs when ε > 0 (thus with decreasing returns to human cap-
ital diversity on a local level; see also Table 1), or when mk is sufficiently
large. However, the former mechanism may cause a persistent difference
between the population in k and the population in the rest of the country
d (as long as there is diversity in human capital), where the latter mecha-
nism causes a difference that will eventually disappear. Thus, with initial
homogeneous human capital, if diverse human capital within one neigh-
borhood hampers human capital accumulation, then neighborhoods with
more diverse human capital (due to immigration) lag in their human capi-
tal accumulation compared to neighborhoods with more equal human cap-
ital. This falling behind could be caused by less communication between
17More specifically, we can definemk,t ≡ PM,tLk,t ,mt ≡
PM,t
Lt
and pk,t ≡ PI,k,tLt , where PI,k,t
is the indigenous population in k at time t, Lk,t ≡ PM,k,t + PI,k,t and Lt ≡ PM,t + PI,t
18Note that we assume symmetry between the learning opportunities for the indigenous
and the migrant population.
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people with different amounts of human capital, where benefits from het-
erogeneous human capital can be found in different sets of knowledge be-
tween individuals. However, communication between the indigenous and
themigrant population should be high to make use of these different sets of
knowledge. De Graaff (2002) looks more deeply into the trade-off between
communication and information sets. In the next section, we drop the as-
sumption of within-group homogeneity and analyze the more realistic case
of heterogeneous human capital.
4 Heterogeneous Human Capital and Migration
Because individuals differ widely in abilities, intelligence and their knowl-
edge, homogeneity is a strong assumption. In this section, we therefore
analyze human capital accumulation and migration patterns in the case
where human capital is heterogeneous. Because of the analytical complex-
ity, we resort to numerical methods.19
We assume (cf. Be´nabou 1996b) that the human capital of agents is ini-
tially lognormally distributed, just as in subsection 2.1 above. Furthermore,
we assume that individuals in s initially have a lower mean human cap-
ital than individuals in d, such that lnhs,0 ∼ N(µs,0, λ2s,0) < lnhd,0 ∼
N(µd,0, λ2d,0). In contrast to the static migration analysis in the previous
section, we now analyze the complete transition path to a migration equi-
librium allowing for multiple flows of immigrants.
In this subsection, we specify the individual moving costs of (11) as:
ci,t(mt, hi,t) = %mvth
ζ
i,t, (19)
with % being a scale parameter, ζ < 0 and v < 0. For the special case of
ζ = 0 we refer to Appendix B for an analytical solution. Thus, individual
migration costs decrease when human capital increases. In the more gen-
eral case, the solution is no longer analytically tractable and we have to rely
on numerical simulations to derive the dynamics of the full model. Table 3
displays the values of the parameters used.
We begin with a small initial stock of migrants compared to the total
number of inhabitants in d. Furthermore, countries s and d have the same
size. We assume that country-specific technology in d is higher than in s.
Both countries exhibit equal (exogenous) growth in human capital. Initial
human capital is assumed to be slightly larger in d than in s. Moreover, the
development of human capital is mainly dependent on the size of initial
human capital (α). The influence of the global environment (γ) is assumed
19Appendix B analytically deals with the accumulation of human capital, both in country
s and in country d in the case in which the cost of migration does not depend on human
capital.
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to be more important than the influence of the local environment (β). Fi-
nally, the higher an individual’s human capital, the lower are the migration
costs, due to the negative human capital coefficient (ζ).
Table 3: Simulation Framework
Initial stock of migrants: m0 0.001
Initial population in the source (s) 10,000
Initial population in the destination (d) 10,000
Initial population in the neighborhood (k) 2,500
Discount factor: δ 0.95
Country-specific technology in the source (s) 1
Country-specific technology in the destination (d) 2
Stock of given capital (K) in s and d 1
Growth Θ (both in s and d) 1.03
Initial human capital in the source (s): µs 0
Initial human capital in the destination (d): µd 0.1
Elasticity of individual human capital: α 0.5
Elasticity of local human capital: β 0.2
Elasticity of national human capital: γ 0.3
Elasticity of total human capital: ρ 0.8
Human capital coefficient: ζ –0.1
Scale parameter: % 5*10−7
In this paper, we are mainly interested in the size of the network externality
(v), the local elasticity of substitution (ε) and the global elasticity of substi-
tution (σ) on the patterns of immigration and the accumulation of human
capital. First, we look at the effect of the network externality on the size
and pattern of immigration. Figure 2 maps out the relation between the
absolute stock of migrants in d and the size of the network externality (v),
using the configuration depicted in Table 3.
Figure 2 shows that a stonger network externality (v lower) causes a
higher level of equilibrium in- and outmigration. This is caused by the
low moving costs. Due to the specific functional form chosen in (19), small
stocks of migrants incur high moving costs when large network externali-
ties are present. As a consequence, the size of migration is relatively small
in early time periods compared to the size of migration when no network
externalities are present.
The next question that arises is to what extent do the local (ε) and global
(σ) elasticities of substitution have an impact on the human capital accumu-
lation of individuals living in k, s, and d? The answer to this question de-
pends on the hypothesis chosen regarding these elasticities. We investigate
here two possible cases.
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Figure 2: Migration patterns with different network externality sizes (with
ε = 0.5 and σ = −1).
4.1 Negative impact of the neighborhood
First, we assume that on a neighborhood level heterogeneity has a strong
negative impact on the development of human capital, where it has a weak-
ly positive impact on the development of human capital on a national level.
So, εmust be slightly larger than 0 and σ must be negative and, in an abso-
lute sense, larger than ε. We can interpret this case as a situation in which
the migrant population and the indigenous population in k have difficul-
ties in communicating, due to large cultural and language differences. They
will not learn from each other, which hampers human capital accumula-
tion. On the other hand, on a national level, the new influx of immigrants
can be beneficial, because the enlarged population demands and supplies
a larger variety of products, there are more niche markets, and there is a
broadening of culture in general. Figure 3 shows the human capital accu-
mulation for this particular case, when the neighborhood k is highly segre-
gated.
In Figure 3, k d and k s denote, respectively, the indigenous and immi-
grant population in k. One can observe that, although the immigrants have
the highest amount of human capital, it deteriorates quickly. The same
holds for the indigenous population in k. Because heterogeneity slows
down human capital accumulation, the human capital of individuals liv-
ing in k deteriorates for a long time, until, in the end, it converges to that of
16
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Figure 3: Human capital accumulation (with ε = 0.1, σ = −2 and υ =
−1.5).
the rest of the country (d).
4.2 Positive impact of the neighborhood
In our second case, we assume that on a neighborhood level heterogene-
ity has a strongly positive impact on the development of human capital,
whereas it has a weakly negative impact on the development of human
capital on a national level. Then ε must be slightly smaller than 0 and
σ must be positive and – in an absolute value – be larger than ε. We
may interpret this case as a situation where there are large learning ef-
fects when immigrants and the indigenous population live close together.
Consider, for example, the case where the immigrant and native languages
are rather similar. Then individuals have few barriers in communicating.
These spillovers could then be beneficial for neighborhood k, but negative
for the rest of the country d. The latter effect can be caused by a brain
drain of immigrants with high human capital from the rest of the country
to neighborhood k, because of the high human capital spillovers. Figure
4 shows the human capital accumulation for this configuration of parame-
ters.
Figure 4 reveals that in the long run the human capital of immigrants
again decreases. But because the human capital of the indigenous popula-
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Figure 4: Human capital accumulation (with ε = −0.1, σ = 2 and υ =
−1.5).
tion increases, average human capital in k remains above that of the rest of
d and will only slowly converge to the level of d. Average human capital in
swill – in the long run – grow at the same rate as human capital in d, but its
level will remain lower, so that there is no absolute convergence, but only
relative convergence. The main differences between Figure 3 and Figure 4
apply to the short run. Due to the composition effect, individuals living in k
witness their human capital decrease in Figure 3 in the short run, while the
human capital in k in Figure 4 receives a large boost in the short run. Fur-
thermore, just as in Figure 3, initially the highly-skilled immigrants leave,
causing a brain drain from s in the short run, from which average human
capital in s only slowly recovers.20
Historical and contemporary evidence shows that both cases can occur.
The processes shown in Figure 3 can be seen in most Western European
countries and in the integration of former guest workers. Because these
immigrants came from further away than before, communication between
the immigrant and indigenous population was, and still is, difficult, and
does not occur as often as within groups. Therefore, immigrants and the
20Although the international literature often assumes that high-skilled immigrants have
lower moving costs than low-skilled immigrants, there is actually not much empirical evi-
dence for this assumption. Stalker (1994) suggests that it is not necessarily the most highly
skilled on a national level who are the first to leave their source country, but the most highly
skilled on a city or village level.
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indigenous population act as substitutes on a local level in their human
capital accumulation. On the other hand, migrants who act as comple-
ments for the indigenous population (cf. Figure 4) are nowadays typically
high-skilled immigrants. Obviously, scientists are among them, but also
exchange students, expatriates, ICT-workers, and the like. Communication
between these immigrants and the indigenous population is mostly in En-
glish and does not raise many problems. These immigrants – although they
form a relatively small minority compared to the lower skilled migrants –
usually live in upmarket neighborhoods. In addition to these two cases,
other kinds of human capital accumulation processes can occur, depend-
ing on the values of v, σ and ε, and the relative levels of human capital.
However, in most Western European countries a process with local substi-
tution seems to be the most prevalent.
5 Conclusion
This paper developed a model to analyze the relation between endoge-
nous migration and human capital accumulation affected by knowledge
spillovers among individuals. In the basic version of the model, we con-
sidered the simple case of homogeneous human capital within a country.
Here, we concluded that the relation between the stock of migrants and the
extent of immigration is ambiguous. If the stock of migrants is large, then
network externalities ensure lower migration costs and thus a higher num-
ber of immigrants. However, if the stock of migrants becomes too large,
wages will decrease because of decreasing returns to scale in aggregate hu-
man capital.21
For the more extended version of the model in which we allowed for
heterogeneous human capital within a population, we had to resort to nu-
merical methods. The results indicate that, within a country, the human
capital of the migrants and that of the indigenous population will even-
tually converge, although only after a considerable time period. As ex-
pected, the results indicate the presence of a brain drain from the source
country, because the more highly skilled are assumed to be the first to
leave.22 However, the average human capital of the high-skilled migrants
will quickly decrease to that of the indigenous population in the same spa-
tial area. Whether average human capital in this clustered area will be
21Evidently, in the presence of downward wage-rigidity, these decreasing returns to scale
assumptions will show up in relatively high unemployment rates as is consistent with styl-
ized empirical facts.
22Recently, some authors (Stark et al. 1997, Beine et al. 2001) argued that brain drains
could be potentially beneficial for source countries. The reason is that because of higher
returns in potential destination countries more investments will be made by the population
in the source country in human capital, so that in the long run growth and brain drains
could be positively correlated.
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lower or higher than in the rest of the country, depends on the level of com-
munication between the immigrant and indigenous population. If their in-
dividual human capital is complementary in human capital accumulation,
so that individuals will learn from each other faster in the case of heteroge-
neous levels of human capital, then average human capital in the clustered
area will be higher than in the rest of the country. On the other hand, if
their human capital can be considered as substitutes, then average human
capital in the clustered area remains lower than in the rest of the country for
a long time. Because of the direct relationship between wages and human
capital, this will have direct consequences for the distribution of earnings
within a country.
We also considered the effect of stronger network externalities on the
process of migration. First, these network externalities enhance migration.
Second, they ensure that the size of the stock of migrants follows a sigmoid
pattern over time. Initially, migration will start slowly, then it accelerates
because of the network effect on the migration costs. Thereafter, migration
will decelerate because of the diminishing returns to human capital, until,
finally, net migration is zero. All migration theories that take network ex-
ternalities into account will have similar effects as in this paper as long as
low-skilled migrants will have incentives to cluster with high-skilled mi-
grants. They can thus provide insight into the cause of spatial heterogene-
ity and its evolution over time. Moreover, they generate insights into the
causes of lagging performance of particular ethnic groups in terms of skill
acquisition.
A Comparative Statics
Combining equilibrium equation (3.11) with wage equation (3.8) gives us
the following relation:
(1− δ)
ρ
c (PM , hs) =
(PIhd + (PM +M)hs)
ρ−1
PI
hd
hs
+ (PM +M)
Ad − (20)
((Ps −M)hs)ρ−1
Ps −M As.
The cost of migration is equal for every migrant because of homogeneous
human capital in s. Note, that in this specification everyone within one
country with the same human capital receives the same wage, so, for exam-
ple, migrants in d receive hsPIhd+(PM+M)hsPY Yd.Moreover, becausemigrants
leave s, population will decrease in s and marginal returns to human capi-
tal, and thus the wage, will increase in s.
To derive the comparative statics characteristics of the model, we can
use the implicit function theorem (see, e.g., Chiang 1984). First, we define
the implicit function Φ as follows:
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Φ =
1− δ
ρ
c(PM , hs)− hsAd (PIhd + (PM +M)hs)ρ−2 + (21)
As (Ps −M)ρ−2 hρs .
Then, using the implicit function theorem, we get dMdx = −
Φ′1(x,M)
Φ′2(x,M)
, ifΦ′2(x,M)
6= 0 where x is a parameter of the model. The determination of the signs of
the derivatives as presented in Table 2 is now straightforward, except for
two. First, the sign of the partial derivative of Φ with respect to ρ is not
immediately clear, but we can write:
∂Φ
∂ρ
= − 1
ρ2
× (22)
{(1− δ)c (PM , hs)+
hs (PIhd + hs (PM +M))
ρ−2 (ln (PIhd + hs (PM +M)))Adρ2
−hs ((Ps −M)hs)ρ−2 (ln (Ps −M)hs)Asρ2
}
< 0,
where the sign of ∂Φ∂ρ is negative, provided that:
PI
hd
hs
+ PM + 2M + (1− δ)c (PM , hs) > Ps (23)
(given that As ≤ Ad).
Second, the partial derivative of Φwith respect to the stock of migrants
is not immediately clear and equals:
∂Φ
∂PM
=
(1− δ)
ρ
∂c (PM , hs)
∂PM
+ (24)
(2− ρ)hs
ρ
ρ (PIhd + hs (PM +M))
ρ−1 hsAd
(PIhd + hs (PM +M))
2
=
(1− δ)
ρ
∂c (PM , hs)
∂PM︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
(2− ρ)hs
ρ (PIhd + hs (PM +M))
wdhs︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
with wdhs the wage that someone with low human capital (hs) will earn in
d. It is now easy to see that eventually (for PM sufficiently large) the second
term will dominate the first term.
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B Human capital accumulation when migration costs
do not depend on human capital
We first assume that human capital in country s is equally distributed for
each individual. Then growth in expected human capital in country s is
straightforwardly denoted as (see also footnote 10):
µs,t+1 = θ + µs,t + γ
σ − 1
σ
λ2s,t
2
, (25)
with variance: λ2s,t+1 = (α + β)
2λ2s,t, which converges to 0. The human
capital distribution in s remains lognormally distributed. However, this is
not the case for the human capital distribution in d. In the country of desti-
nation, every group of migrants and indigenous population is lognormally
ditributed, and where total population in k or the rest of d is the sum of
lognormal distributions. Therefore, analytical expressions for the growth
in expected human capital in areas in d are – although feasibile – not in-
sightful. Instead, we may look at the differences in expected human capital
accumulation. The difference in expected human capital growth between
the indigenous and the migrant population in k can again be denoted as:
µd,k,t+1 − µs,k,t+1 = α (µd,k,t − µs,k,t) . (26)
Because α < 1, human capital within a neighborhood will converge by
construct. If we, e.g., want to model the ethnic capital concept of Borjas
(1992, 1995), then we have to allow for different human capital spillovers
for the migrant and the indigenous population. Here, we are especially
interested in the difference in human capital accumulation between the mi-
gration population inside and the indigenous population outside neighbor-
hood k. Unfortunately, the expression is rather complex and equals:
µd,t+1 − µs,k,t+1 = α (µd,t − µs,k,t) + β (µd,t − E ln[Hk,t]) , (27)
with:
E ln[Hk,t] =
ε
ε− 1 ln (28)
t−1∑
τ=0
mk,t,t−τ
(
E [hd,s,t,t−τ ] exp
{
−λ
2
d,s,t,t−τ
2ε
}) ε−1
ε
+
(
1−
t−1∑
τ=0
mk,t,t−τ
)(
E [hd,k,t] exp
{
−λ
2
d,k,t
2ε
}) ε−1
ε
 ,
where
t−1∑
τ=0
mk,t,t−τ denotes all migrant groups, who came to k in the
past. All migrant and indigenous groups in (28) seperate are still lognor-
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mally distributed. However, the expectation of Hk,t is affected by some
weighted average of expectations of the human capital of the various groups
living in k. Basically, equation (28) has the same characteristics as those de-
scribed in footnote 9. So again, whether human capital in k is larger than
in d depends on the size of the group of migrants and the value of ε. If
ε is larger than zero, then there are again decreasing returns to diversity.
Otherwise there are increasing returns to diversity. Thus, with heteroge-
nous human capital the analytical results do not change in nature. Due to
the larger variation in human capital, it is likely that the dynamic evolution
of human capital accumulation fluctuates more strongly whenincorporat-
ing heterogenous human capital. In this setting, the parameter σ being a
national parameter does not have any influence on differences in human
growth within a country. If there are national returns to diversity (σ < 0),
then immigration will benefit a country as a whole, because of the inflow
of different amounts of human capital.
Note that the variances in human capital will eventually converge to
zero for all groups, due to the fact that we do not allow for idiosyncratic
shocks in human capital accumulation. Therefore, human capital differ-
ences within a country will eventually disappear, because of the averag-
ing influence of human capital in the neighborhood and the country as a
whole. However, we know that idiosyncratic shocks do occur. For exam-
ple, persons are born. Therefore, convergence does not necessarily occur in
practice.
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